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helpful comments and suggestions.Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?
This paper tests the hypothesis that irrational market misvaluation aﬀects ﬁrms’ takeover
behavior. We employ two contemporaneous proxies for market misvaluation, pre-takeover
book/price ratios and pre-takeover ratios of residual income model value to price. Mis-
valuation of bidders and targets inﬂuences the means of payment chosen, the mode of
acquisition, the premia paid, target hostility to the oﬀer, the likelihood of oﬀer success,
and bidder and target announcement period stock returns. The evidence is broadly
supportive of the misvaluation hypothesis.The biggest reason AOL Time Warner has been such a dog for investors is that
the deal creating the company was done on terms that were insane. And the really
painful part is that this was perfectly clear at the time. .... Trouble was, AOL
stock was ridiculously overvalued... So don’t blame Case for what has happened.
He chose the moment, almost to the day, when his stock was most valuable and
then used it as currency. He served his shareholders well. It was Time Warner
that sold itself for wampum.
—Geoﬀrey Colvin, “Time Warner, Don’t Blame Steve Case,” February 3, 2003, Fortune.
1 Introduction
Despite a rising interest in psychological approaches to economic decisions in recent
years, there has been relatively little study of the degree to which market misvaluation of
ﬁrms inﬂuences investment decisions.1 An important kind of investment is the purchase
of another ﬁrm, and a great deal of data are available about the terms and characteristics
of takeover transactions. The takeover market is therefore an attractive testing ground
for the hypothesis that market misvaluation aﬀects resource allocation and the strategic
interaction of ﬁrms.
The idea that ineﬃcient market misvaluation is an important driver of the takeover
market is not new. For example, Brealey and Myers (2000) (p. 949) discuss a ‘bootstrap’
game, allegedly important during the diversiﬁcation boom of the 1960’s, based on naive
investor interpretations of price/earnings ratios. Nevertheless, as discussed by Shleifer
and Vishny (2003), the misvaluation approach to takeovers has had a low proﬁle among
academics relative to eﬃcient markets approaches. Shleifer and Vishny oﬀer a theory
in which irrational shifts in investor sentiment aﬀect takeover decisions. In their setting
there are no synergies, managers behave rationally, and takeovers are driven purely by
irrational stock market misvaluation.
In this paper, we examine empirically the misvaluation hypothesis of takeovers: that
market ineﬃciency has important eﬀects on takeover activity. We test several of the
predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), as well as several further predictions of the
misvaluation hypothesis developed intuitively here to further distinguish it from alter-
native approaches.
1On the ﬁnancing side, several authors have provided evidence that ﬁrms time new equity issues to
exploit market misvaluation, and manage earnings to induce such misvaluation—see, e.g., Ritter (1991),
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Rajan and Servaes (1997), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Teoh,
Wong, and Rao (1998) and Baker and Wurgler (2000)). Recent evidence suggests that ineﬃcient market
valuations inﬂuence levels of investment (Polk and Sapienza (2003)) and the sensitivity of investment
to cash ﬂow (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003))
1The misvaluation hypothesis holds that bidders try to proﬁt either by buying under-
valued targets for cash at a price below fundamental value; or by paying equity for targets
that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued than the bidder. As argued by Shleifer and
Vishny, target overvaluation encourages target management to voluntarily accept expro-
priative oﬀers in order to ‘cash out.’ Bidder and target misvaluation measures should
aﬀect expropriation opportunities and managerial incentives, and therefore transaction
characteristics, including the means of payment (stock versus cash), the form of the oﬀer
(merger versus tender oﬀer), the bid premium, hostility of the target to the oﬀer, the
success of the bid, and event period returns. The misvaluation hypothesis also implies
that bidders will tend to be overvalued relative to targets, especially among stock oﬀers,
in which it is the bidder’s relative overvaluation that enables its expropriation of target
assets.
An alternative theory, which we call the Q hypothesis of takeovers, focuses on how
takeover can cause target assets to be employed either more or less eﬃciently. These
changes may derive from elimination of wasteful target behavior, from better bidder
investment opportunities, or alternatively from the empire-building propensities of bid-
ders.2 High market value is an indicator that a ﬁrm is ‘good,’ i.e., is well-run or has
good business opportunities, as it reﬂects the extent to which the ﬁrm has succeeded
in creating shareholder value from past investment. Takeovers of bad targets by good
bidders tend to improve eﬃciency more than takeovers of good targets by bad bidders.
The detailed predictions of the misvaluation and Q hypotheses are developed in Section
2.
We deﬁne misvaluation as the discrepancy between the current market price and
fundamental value. To estimate this discrepancy, we apply two contemporaneous non-
market measures of fundamental value: book value, and residual income value as derived
from the model of Ohlson (1995). Our misvaluation proxies are therefore the ratio of
book value of equity to price (hereafter B=P), and the ratio of residual-income value to
price (hereafter V=P).
Previous papers have related B=P or allied variables to takeover characteristics, often
with much older or restricted samples. There are very few ﬁndings about B=P in relation
to takeover characteristics that use data from the last decade, the period of by far the
largest takeover wave in history. The total value of transactions (2001 dollars) from the
2Our development of the Q hypothesis is based upon the work on Tobin’s Q and takeovers of
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), Servaes (1991), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), and on agency,
growth and takeovers of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990). Another possible alternative, the ﬁnancing
constraint/debt capacity hypothesis, can be distinguished by controlling for leverage; see Section 2.
2last 8 years of our sample, 1993-2000 of $4.35 trillion is much greater than the total
value of transactions in the preceding 15 years of our dataset of $1.18 trillion. Indeed,
the transaction value from 1997-2000 alone is $3.59 trillion.
Furthermore, most past tests condition on what are, according to the misvaluation
hypothesis, dependent variables. For example, most studies condition on oﬀer success.
But if misvaluation aﬀects success and so does a transaction characteristic (such as
friendly versus hostile, merger versus tender, or cash versus equity), then conditioning
on success induces a correlation between misvaluation and the characteristic even if
misvaluation has no eﬀect on the characteristic.
In this paper we use two further means to test the misvaluation hypothesis and
distinguish it from alternative theories. First, we test a wider set of theoretical predic-
tions about misvaluation and takeover characteristics. We thereby expose the theories
to possible refutation from diﬀerent directions. Second, we apply a purer measure of
misvaluation, contemporaneous V=P.
B=P has been viewed as a mispricing proxy in several asset pricing and corporate
ﬁnance contexts. However, book value reﬂects only historical costs rather than forward-
looking prospects. In consequence, B=P (or closely allied variables such as the reciprocal
of proxies for Tobin’s Q) is a proxy not just for misvaluation, but for genuine information
about the ability of the ﬁrm to generate high returns on its investments. B=P or allied
variables have therefore also been applied in many corporate ﬁnance papers as proxies
for ﬁrm growth opportunities or managerial eﬀectiveness.
An alternative, forward-looking measure of ﬁrm fundamental value derives from the
residual income model, which has been widely applied in the accounting literature.3
Residual income value (V ) reﬂects expected future performance by incorporating an-
alysts’ forecasts of future earnings in addition to book value. Since the numerator of
V captures future earnings prospects, V=P ﬁlters out the extraneous information about
growth and managerial agency problems much better than B=P. V=P therefore provides
a relatively pure measure of misvaluation. Thus, the misvaluation hypothesis oﬀers a
rich set of distinctive empirical implications about V=P.
However, it is unlikely that analyst forecasts perfectly ﬁlter information about growth
from the market price. To further control for growth, we examine the eﬀects of bidder
and target V=P after controlling for bidder and target B=P. Focusing solely on this incre-
3Support for the use of V=P as a mispricing proxy is provided by Frankel and Lee (1998), Lee, Myers,
and Swaminathan (1999), and Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003); a corporate ﬁnance application is
provided by D’Mello and Shrof (2000).
3mental eﬀect provides a double safeguard for growth or agency-related eﬀects. However,
such a test is overly stringent. The evidence from past literature (see Section 3) sug-
gests that B=P is informative about misvaluation, both on its own and incrementally
to V=P. So controlling for B=P is likely to remove not only growth, but part of the
misvaluation eﬀect we seek to measure. We therefore provide evidence about both B=P
and V=P in univariate and multivariate tests. Subsection 3.1 discusses in greater depth
the motivation for and diﬀerences between B=P and V=P as misvaluation proxies.
To address the misvaluation hypothesis systematically, we consider statistical evi-
dence during the period January 1, 1978 through December 31, 2000 about the relation
of misvaluation measures to takeover-related decisions and market reactions. We sum-
marize the main qualitative ﬁndings in the Appendix Table.
For each cross-sectional prediction we have four tests (univariate and multivariate,
B=P and V=P), with the V=P tests highly stringent. The particular ﬁndings in some
cases diﬀer across tests, but the main thrust of our ﬁndings is as follows. (We mention
the Q hypothesis only for those tests for which it makes an unambiguous prediction.)
Bidders on average have signiﬁcantly lower B=P and V=P ratios (indicating greater
measured overvaluation) than their targets, consistent with the misvaluation hypothe-
sis.4 Consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis, this eﬀect is present in both cash and
stock oﬀers, is stronger among stock oﬀers, and is present in both mergers and tender
oﬀers.
Greater measured target overvaluation is generally associated with a greater (smaller)
probability that equity (cash) is the sole means of payment. This evidence is consistent
with bidders making friendly equity oﬀers to overvalued targets (Shleifer and Vishny
(2003)) and using equity oﬀers to leave more target overvaluation on the shoulders of
target shareholders.
Targets with greater measured overvaluation (less undervaluation) are less likely to
be hostile to the bid, are less likely to receive tender oﬀers rather than merger bids,
have a higher probability of being successfully acquired, earn lower announcement date
abnormal returns, and tend to receive lower bid premia.5 The misvaluation hypothesis
predicts these relationships because undervalued targets tend to be hostile to expropria-
tive bids, implying hostile tender oﬀer rather than friendly merger bid, higher premia
4Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) ﬁnd that target exceeds
bidder B=P among oﬀers that subsequently succeeded.
5The B=P ﬁnding on target stock returns is consistent with the ﬁndings of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling
(1989) and Servaes (1991) in earlier samples that condition on subsequent oﬀer success; the premium
ﬁnding is consistent with that of Walkling and Edmister (1985) in an early sample.
4relative to the depressed market stock price, and thereby higher target announcement
date returns. In contrast, managers of overvalued targets are willing to accept oﬀers to
‘cash out’ (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). The Q hypothesis shares the predictions about
premia and abnormal returns, because greater gains from takeover are generated when
targets are poorly-run or have poor opportunities (high B=P), and some of this gain is
shared with target shareholders.
Higher measured target overvaluation is associated with a lower bidder return only
in the univariate test. This univariate (but not the multivariate) ﬁnding supports the
misvaluation hypothesis because more overvalued target should generate lower gains for
bidders; and, for B=P, supports the Q hypothesis because well-run or rapidly growing
targets should generate lower gains for bidders (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Servaes (1991)).
Turning to the eﬀects of bidder valuations on transaction characteristics, we ﬁnd
that bidders with higher estimated overvaluation are more likely to use stock and less
likely to use cash as the sole consideration. This is consistent with bidders proﬁting by
exchanging overvalued equity for more valuable target assets.6
With the B=P measure, more overvalued bidders tend to pay higher premia (with
more consistent signiﬁcance in the equity subsample). This evidence is consistent with
the misvaluation hypothesis, because overvalued bidders are willing to pay a nominally
higher price using overvalued equity as currency, and ﬁnd it easier to raise capital for a
cash oﬀer. It is also consistent with the Q hypothesis, because better bidders generate
bigger gains which are in part shared with target shareholders. There is no signiﬁcant
V=P eﬀect; this ﬁnding fails to support the misvaluation hypothesis.
It is striking that greater estimated bidder overvaluation (lower B=P and V=P) is
strongly associated with lower bidder announcement-date abnormal stock returns. This
is consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis, which predicts that the stock reaction
will partly correct prior misvaluation. The B=P ﬁnding is directly opposed to the
Q hypothesis, which predicts that oﬀers by well-run bidders should generate higher
bidder stock returns. Our ﬁnding also contrasts sharply with evidence from earlier time
periods.7 This contrast suggests that agency or other resource reallocation eﬀects may
6An association between bidder B=P (or Q) and means of payment conditional upon subsequent
oﬀer success was established by Martin (1996) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998). Our ﬁnding that
undervaluation as measured by V=P predicts the use of cash rather than equity provides evidence that
misvaluation matters above and beyond any possible growth-related eﬀects.
7In Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991), announcement-period bidder returns in
successful oﬀers were higher when bidders had high Tobin’s Q measures; B=P is inversely related to Q
5have been more important during the merger boom of the 1980’s than in more recent
years.
Overall, the evidence in this paper generally conﬁrms a wide range of predictions
for the misvaluation hypothesis. The B=P evidence on the whole strongly supports the
misvaluation hypothesis. The Q hypothesis oﬀers a narrower range of predictions about
B=P—in relation to bid premia and announcement date returns—several of which are
conﬁrmed. In the case where the two hypotheses make directly opposing predictions
(the relation between bidder B=P and bidder announcement period return), it is the
misvaluation prediction that is conﬁrmed. The V=P evidence overall provides substantial
additional support for the misvaluation hypothesis. These ﬁndings do not rule out the
possibility of important growth/agency eﬀects. However, the evidence provides clearer
support for the proposition that irrational market misvaluation aﬀects the behavior of
both bidders and targets in takeover contests.
There has also been some recent independent work on transaction-level valuations
and means of payment in takeovers. Ang and Cheng (2003) use an industry-relative
book-to-price ratio, and a residual income measure to examine how misvaluation aﬀects
the means of payment in takeovers, and long-run abnormal return performance of the
combined ﬁrm. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2003) examine how ﬁrm
and industry valuations relate to means of payment and merger frequency. In this
paper, in order to expose the misvaluation hypothesis to possible disconﬁrmation on
several fronts, we examine a wider set of takeover characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the predic-
tions of the misvaluation hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and method of the
study. Section 4 describes univariate tests of the relation between bidder or target mis-
valuation on diﬀerent transaction characteristics. Section 5 describes multivariate tests.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Predictions
We develop a set of implications of the misvaluation hypothesis for the relation of contem-
poraneous measures of misvaluation, B=P and V=P to takeover characteristics, drawing
insights from the theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). We then contrast the implications
of the misvaluation hypothesis with those of alternative theories.
In Shleifer and Vishny’s approach, managers rationally value ﬁrms, and investors do
(see also footnote 13).
6not. Cash takeovers result from the eﬀorts of bidders to acquire undervalued targets
at prices below fundamental value. Equity takeovers result from the eﬀorts of highly
overvalued bidders to trade their assets for less overvalued target assets, thereby achiev-
ing a favorable real exchange ratio. Target managers accept such oﬀers if the target is
also overvalued, as takeover gives target management the chance to ‘cash out’ of illiquid
stock or option holdings. More generally, the misvaluation hypothesis reﬂects the insight
that the willingness of target management to cash out should tend to be greater when
the target is less undervalued (or more overvalued).8
As discussed above, the only way a stock bidder can proﬁt from misvaluation is
to acquire a less overvalued (but still overvalued) target. The bidder-target valuation
diﬀerential will tend to be smaller for cash oﬀers, because even a bidder that is un-
dervalued relative to its target can sometimes proﬁt by buying an undervalued target
cheaply. Nevertheless, even cash bidders should on average be overvalued relative to
their targets, for two reasons. First, the ability to raise capital cheaply loosens a ﬁrm’s
cash constraints, so overvaluation encourages making a cash bid over no bid. Second,
cash bidders proﬁt by acquiring undervalued targets.
We therefore have:
Prediction 1 Bidder versus Target Misvaluation
i. Both equity and cash bidders are on average overvalued relative to their targets.
ii. The average valuation diﬀerence between bidders and targets is greater for equity than
for cash oﬀers.
The reasoning underlying Prediction 1 directly implies that bidders are overvalued
relative to targets in a general sample as well. Furthermore, the arguments for bidder
overvaluation relative to targets (bidder overvaluation eases raising capital, and relative
overvaluation generates proﬁts in equity bids) applies to both merger bids and tender
oﬀers. So we also have:
Prediction 1 (continued)
iii. In both tender oﬀers and merger bids, acquirers are on average overvalued relative
to their targets.
As discussed earlier, in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) overvalued targets receive equity
8We do not insist that voluntary acceptance occur if and only if a target is overvalued. In practice
the manager of an undervalued target may be pressured to sell by shareholders enthusiastic about the
oﬀered premium, or induced to sell by bidders oﬀering indirect side payments. Such eﬀects smooth the
relationship between target valuation and the probability that the target is willing to sell the ﬁrm to
an expropriative bidder.
7oﬀers (since overvalued target management is willing to cash out even to relatively over-
valued equity bidders). There is a further reason: ceteris paribus, the more overvalued
(or less undervalued) the target, the stronger the incentive of the bidder to leave part of
the target’s misvaluation on the shoulders of target shareholders. Paying with equity of
the merged ﬁrm does so. We therefore have:
Prediction 2 Eﬀects of Target Misvaluation
Greater target overvaluation is associated with:
i. Greater use of stock rather than cash as a means of payment.
An immediate corollary of Prediction 2.i. is that equity targets are on average overvalued
relative to cash targets.
Since cash oﬀers exploit unwilling, undervalued targets, whereas less undervalued
or more overvalued targets are more willing to ‘cash out’ to relatively overvalued eq-
uity oﬀers, higher target overvaluation should be associated with a greater likelihood of
transaction friendliness. Also, since merger bids require management approval whereas
tender oﬀers can bypass management, hostility is associated with tender oﬀer rather
than merger bid.9 Finally, since target overvaluation encourages target management
acceptance, it should also improve the probability of oﬀer success. We therefore have:
Prediction 2 (continued) Greater target overvaluation is associated with:
ii. A lower probability that the oﬀer is hostile;
iii. A lower probability that the oﬀer is a tender oﬀer rather than a merger bid; and
iv. A greater probability of success.
Furthermore, greater undervaluation increases a target’s incentive to ﬁght to main-
tain a premium (or avoid a discount) relative to fundamental value. This has the eﬀect
of boosting the premium relative to the market price. We therefore have:
Prediction 2 (continued) Greater target overvaluation is associated with:
v. A lower bid premium.
Despite Prediction 2.v, the misvaluation hypothesis also predicts:
Prediction 2 (continued) Greater target overvaluation is associated with:
vi. Lower bidder announcement date stock returns.
The reason is that in equity oﬀers, the bidder proﬁts precisely from being more overvalued
9The use of cash can expedite a hostile transaction by avoiding the SEC ﬁling requirements associated
with equity issuance, and, perhaps, by making it easier for investors to evaluate the oﬀer.
8than its target; and in cash oﬀers, target undervaluation is the source of bidder proﬁts.
For cash oﬀers, this eﬀect is moderated (but not reversed) by the fact that as target
undervaluation increases, so does target opposition. Since equity oﬀers are on the whole
friendly, this moderating eﬀect is relatively weak. Thus, the eﬀect in Prediction 2.vi
should be driven primarily by equity rather than cash oﬀers.
Given a bid, greater bidder overvaluation increases the incentive to pay with equity
rather than cash by reducing the fundamental cost per dollar of market value oﬀered as
consideration.10 We therefore obtain:
Prediction 3 Eﬀects of Bidder Misvaluation
Greater bidder overvaluation is associated with:
i. Greater use of stock rather than cash as a means of payment.
An immediate corollary of Prediction 3.i is that stock bidders are overvalued relative to
cash bidders.
Greater bidder overvaluation does not necessarily increase the likelihood that the oﬀer
will be friendly, owing to opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, greater bidder overvaluation
makes it more likely that the bidder makes a relatively overvalued stock oﬀer to an
overvalued target rather than a hostile cash oﬀer to an undervalued target (Shleifer
and Vishny (2003)). Furthermore, less cash constrained ﬁrms can aﬀord to pay more,
reducing hostility. On the other hand, among equity oﬀers, greater bidder overvaluation
ceteris paribus increases the expropriation of target assets. Among cash oﬀers, greater
bidder overvaluation may make the bidder more vulnerable to public disparagement
by the target (which, if credible, may constrain the bidder’s ability to raise capital);
Schwert (2000) analyzes publicity as part of the takeover bargaining process). These
considerations should tend to increase target opposition.11 Similarly, the prediction is
ambiguous as to whether higher bidder overvaluation promotes merger bid versus tender
oﬀer, hostility versus friendliness, and higher versus lower probability of success.
10See Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Overvaluation encourages making
either a stock or a cash oﬀer relative to no oﬀer. The incentive of an overvalued ﬁrm to make an
equity oﬀer is direct: the ability to pay with overvalued equity. Cash bids are encouraged indirectly;
the ability of an overvalued ﬁrm to raise equity capital cheaply relaxes capital constraints. Since
performing a separate equity issue in addition to a takeover bid is costly (investment banking fees,
management time, and possible oﬀer delay), overvaluation should encourage stock over cash oﬀers.
11Target management will oppose expropriation to the extent that its incentives are aligned with
the interests of its shareholders; or if the bidder stock or perquisites that target management will
receive upon acquisition are imperfectly liquid, so that bidder overvaluation imposes a cost upon target
management.
9Overvaluation should loosen capital constraints, so overvalued cash bidders should
be able to aﬀord to oﬀer a higher premium in order to ensure success. Furthermore,
an overvalued equity oﬀer is less attractive to target management than a corresponding
cash premium, so overvaluation increases the pressure on an equity bidder to boost the
premium and thereby target stock returns. We therefore have:
Prediction 3 (continued) Greater bidder overvaluation is associated with:
ii. Higher bid premia.
iii. Higher target announcement date stock returns.
The misvaluation hypothesis further implies that greater bidder overvaluation should
be associated with lower (more negative) returns to bidders, for two reasons. First,
takeover bids are salient events that call attention to the ﬁrms involved. To the extent
that more careful analysis helps investors correct misvaluation, the stock price reaction
will tend to oppose the prior misvaluation.12 Second, as discussed above, overvalued
bidders are predicted to oﬀer high bid premia to targets. Relatedly, in the case of equity
oﬀers, the market will tend to believe mistakenly that the bidder is paying too much
(since the market overvalues the equity being oﬀered more than it overvalues the target
assets). For both reasons, we have:
Prediction 4 Bidder Misvaluation and Announcement Date Returns
Greater bidder overvaluation is associated with lower bidder announcement date stock
returns.
Similarly, the misvaluation hypothesis implies that more overvalued targets should
tend to have more negative announcement period returns, for three reasons. First, as
with misvalued bidders, an oﬀer draws attention to the target, partly correcting prior
overvaluation. Second, overvalued targets tend to receive low bid premia (Prediction
2.vi). Third, the more the market overvalues (or less it undervalues) target assets, the
less attractive a given premium seems to investors. We therefore have:
Prediction 5 Target Misvaluation and Announcement Date Returns
Greater target overvaluation is associated with lower target announcement date abnormal
returns.
We test these predictions using contemporaneous measures of misvaluation, B=P
12Such partial correction of prior misvaluation is consistent with a body of evidence about various
types of discretionary corporate actions that post-event long-run abnormal returns tend to be of the
same sign as initial event-date reactions; this literature is reviewed in Hirshleifer (2001).
10and V=P.
Alternative Theories
Two alternative possible explanations for a relation between B=P and takeover char-
acteristics are what we call the Q hypothesis of takeovers (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling
(1989), Servaes (1991), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)), and the ﬁnancing con-
straint/debt capacity hypothesis. The Q hypothesis asserts that takeovers reallocate
target assets to diﬀerent uses. These uses can generate higher or lower payoﬀs depend-
ing on the quality of bidder and target management, and on the business opportunities
of bidder and target ﬁrms.
In this approach, Tobin’s Q, proxied by the ratio of ﬁrm market value to book
value, is an indicator of the degree to which a ﬁrm has good opportunities to create
shareholder market value from invested resources. Takeover bidders can create value by
making better use of target assets, possibly owing to higher managerial quality. On the
other hand, poorly run bidders may waste resources on takeovers and make poor use of
target assets. For example, bidders may waste their free cash ﬂow (Jensen (1986)), or
make empire-building equity oﬀers.
Thus, the Q hypothesis predicts that greater total gains are generated in acquisitions
involving bad targets and good bidders than in transactions involving good targets and
bad bidders. These larger gains are shared between bidder and target. So higher bidder
valuation and lower target valuation are predicted to be associated with high bidder
and target returns (see Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), and Servaes (1991)), and (we
further predict) higher bid premia.
When proxies for Q are high, equity B=P tends to be low, so our B=P is an inverse
measure of the bidder or target’s ability to create value from existing assets.13 The
Q hypothesis predictions that higher bidder valuations are associated with higher bid
premia and target returns are therefore consistent with the prediction for B=P of Pre-
dictions 3.ii and 3.iii of the misvaluation hypothesis. The prediction that higher target
valuation is associated with lower bidder returns is also consistent with the prediction
for B=P of Prediction 2.vi of the misvaluation hypothesis. (An alternative agency story
with essentially the same empirical implication is that bad bidders like to acquire rapidly
growing targets but do not proﬁt by doing so [see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)].)
The Q approach is also consistent with Prediction 5’s implication for B=P, because
13Empirical studies on Tobin’s Q and takeovers use Q proxies relating to the ratio of total asset
rather than equity values. However, equity B=P is highly correlated with asset B=P; furthermore, our
multivariate tests include leverage controls.
11there is less room to improve a target that is already well-run (low B=P), implying
lower average target announcement date abnormal returns. Of course, even in those
cases where both theories make consistent predictions, empirical testing is important
since the data could easily reject both hypotheses.
The prediction that higher bidder valuations are associated with higher bidder re-
turns is directly opposed to the prediction for B=P of Prediction 4 of the misvaluation
hypothesis. The relation between bidder B=P and bidder returns is therefore particu-
larly relevant in distinguishing the alternative hypotheses.
The Q hypothesis does not oﬀer predictions about how either bidder or target valua-
tions relate to hostility, nor to related takeover characteristics such as merger bid versus
tender oﬀer, cash versus equity, or probability of oﬀer success. For example, in their
hypotheses and tests, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1990), Servaes (1991), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)) do not distinguish between
hostile and friendly oﬀers, and their predictions are the same for tender oﬀers versus
mergers, and for cash versus equity bids.14
Under the Q hypothesis there is no presumption as to whether bidder or target
Q is higher. Takeovers can involve empire-building purchases of high-Q targets by
low-Q bidders, but also value-improving purchases of low-Q targets by high-Q bidders.
Thus, the Q theory makes no prediction about relative valuations corresponding to the
misvaluation hypothesis Predictions 1.i-1.iii.
Overall, the misvaluation hypothesis oﬀers a wider range of implications than the Q
hypothesis. The two approaches overlap on several B=P predictions about premia and
announcement date returns, and are in sharp conﬂict over the relation between bidder
valuation and bidder returns. The predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis about V=P
are distinctive. Multivariate V=P tests that control for B=P provide a backstop control
for growth-related eﬀects, and provide very stringent tests for misvaluation eﬀects.
Theories of ﬁnancing and capital structure predict that leverage levels will be related
to ﬁrms’ growth opportunities, so there is ex ante reason to expect leverage and B=P
to be correlated. The ﬁnancing constraint/debt capacity hypothesis holds that leverage,
ﬁnancing constraints and growth opportunities inﬂuence bidder behavior. For example,
a highly leveraged bidder or a high growth bidder may be more inclined to pay with
equity than with cash (on the latter point, see Martin (1996)). In order to focus on
14Disciplinary acquisitions presumably tend to involve low valuation targets. However, since, under
the Q approach, oﬀers involving high valuation bidders and low valuation targets generate relatively
high gains to be shared, it is not obvious that they are necessarily hostile on the whole.
12the eﬀects of misvaluation, we therefore control for leverage in our multivariate tests.
Since V=P is puriﬁed of much of the growth eﬀects contained in B=P, our tests with
V=P should be much less subject to an interpretation in terms of ﬁnancing constraints
and growth. Our tests of the eﬀects of V=P after controlling for B=P provide an even
stronger control.
3 Data and Methodology
Our sample of takeover bids is obtained from Security Data Corporation (SDC) U.S.
mergers and acquisitions database between 1978-2000. Our sample contains both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful oﬀers subject to the following selection criteria:
² Both the acquiring and target ﬁrms are traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
and their price and return data are available over the eleven-day period around the
acquisition announcement from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
² The value of the transaction is $10 million or more.
² The oﬀer is announced between January 1, 1978 and December 31, 2000.
² If an acquirer makes multiple attempts to acquire the same target, only the ﬁrst
announcement is included in the sample.
The ﬁnal sample includes 2,922 successful and 810 unsuccessful acquisition bids.15 Table
1 reports the annual breakdown of the acquisitions by acquisition outcome, method of
payment, mode of acquisition, hostility of the transaction, and whether the bidder and
the target are in the same industry.
Accounting data for calculating book value and residual income model value (de-
scribed below) are from COMPUSTAT. Earnings forecasts needed for calculating the
residual income model intrinsic values are obtained from I/B/E/S. To maintain sample
size, we do not exclude a transaction from the overall sample just because of missing
accounting or I/B/E/S data items.
15The bid premium is deﬁned as the bid price of the oﬀer divided by the market price of the target
5 days before the announcement. If the bid premium is less than -50% or greater than 200%, then we
treat it as missing. We require that target stock price at the time of the announcement exceed $3. To
ensure data accuracy, for successful acquisitions, we compare the CRSP delisting date of the target and
the SDC eﬀective date. If the diﬀerence between the two dates is greater than 40 trading days, then
the acquisition is deleted from the sample.
133.1 Motivation for and Calculation of Mispricing Proxies
The reliability of the inferences we draw about the misvaluation hypothesis of takeover
markets rests upon the quality of our misvaluation proxies, B=P and V=P. The validity
of our approach, however, does not require that either book value or residual income value
be a better proxy for rational fundamental value than market price. We merely require
that these measures contain substantial incremental information about fundamentals
above and beyond market price. We would expect them to do so if a signiﬁcant portion
of variations in market price derives from misvaluation.
A possible alternative means of testing the misvaluation hypothesis is to estimate
long-run stock returns. A stock that is ineﬃciently mispriced should eventually earn
abnormal returns when misvaluation is corrected. Thus, long-run abnormal returns pro-
vides an indirect measure of misvaluation. Several authors have examined the long-run
abnormal returns to successful acquirers, and how these returns relate to means of pay-
ment and pre-oﬀer valuation measures.16 Such studies generally focus on merged ﬁrms,
and therefore do not measure how mispricing relates to oﬀer success, nor on the distinct
eﬀects of bidder versus target misvaluations. Furthermore, there is much controversy
about how to interpret long-run post-event returns, which may reﬂect rational risk pre-
mia.17 A key advantage of tests based on contemporaneous measures of misvaluation is
that it does not require drawing inferences from stock returns occurring years after the
takeover event.
In support of the B=P proxy, an extensive literature demonstrates that ﬁrms’ B=P
ratios are remarkably strong and robust predictors of the cross-section of subsequent one-
month returns (see, e.g., the review of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002)). Psychology-
based theoretical models imply that B=P is a proxy for misvaluation, and thereby will
predict subsequent abnormal returns (see, e.g., Barberis and Huang (2001) and Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)). Market values reﬂect both mispricing, risk,
and diﬀerences in true unconditional expected cash ﬂows (or scale). Book value can
help ﬁlter out irrelevant scale diﬀerences, and so B=P can provide a less noisy measure
16See, for example, Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen
(1998), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2002), and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003a,
2003b).
17Some recent overviews include Fama (1998), Loughran and Ritter (2000), and Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Teoh (2002)). The outcomes of long-run return studies are often sensitive to the empirical method,
including the choice of the return benchmark, the method for compounding returns, and the treatment
of cross-event return correlations (Barber and Lyon (1997), Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000), Fama (1998),
and Loughran and Ritter (2000)).
14of mispricing (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)). On the other hand,
B=P is a natural proxy for risk as well. An active debate remains about the extent to
which B=P-based return predictability reﬂects a rational risk premium or correction of
mispricing.18
The association of B=P with subsequent abnormal returns suggests that there is a
misvaluation or risk component to the variation of B=P. However, B=P has been used
as a proxy not just for misvaluation or for risk, but also for growth opportunities and for
the degree of information asymmetry (Martin (1996)). Furthermore, proxies for Tobin’s
Q that are highly correlated with B=P have been employed to measure the quality of
corporate growth opportunities and the degree of managerial discipline. A further source
of noise in B=P for our purposes is that book value, the numerator of B=P, is inﬂuenced
by ﬁrm and industry diﬀerences in accounting methods.
We calculate B=P as a ratio of equity rather than total asset values, because it is
equity rather than total misvaluation that is likely to matter for takeover decisions; a
similar point applies for V=P. This would be the case, for example, for a misvalued
bidder that contemplates using equity shares to purchase the equity shares of a target
ﬁrm. Similarly, a potential bidder that is overvalued is presumably more likely to raise
equity rather than debt capital to ﬁnance a takeover bid.
There is also strong support for V=P as an indicator of mispricing. Lee, Myers,
and Swaminathan (1999) ﬁnd that aggregate residual income values predict one-month-
ahead returns on the Dow 30 stocks better than aggregate B=P. Frankel and Lee (1998)
ﬁnd that V is a better predictor than book value of the cross-section of contempora-
neous stock prices, and that V=P is a predictor of the one-year-ahead cross-section of
returns. Furthermore, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) report that the abnormal re-
turns associated with high V=P are partially concentrated around subsequent earnings
announcements. They also report that after controlling for a large set of possible risk
factors (including beta, size, book/market, residual risk, and loadings from the Fama and
French (1996) three-factor model), V=P continues to predict future returns signiﬁcantly.
These ﬁndings make V=P an attractive index of mispricing.19
18See, e.g., Fama and French (1996) and Daniel and Titman (1997), and the review of Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer, and Teoh (2002). Some more recent empirical papers addressing factor risk versus mispricing as
explanations for the B=P premium include Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002), Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho
(2002) and Vassalou and Xing (2003).
19For example, D’Mello and Shrof (2000) apply V=P to measure mispricing of equity repurchasers.
To test the hypothesis that private information inﬂuences the takeover bidders’ choice of means of
payment, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2002) use ex post realized earnings as inputs in valuation models
to construct proxies for private signals. In contrast, our focus is on measuring market pricing errors
15There are other possible indices of misvaluation. An alternative measure which we
do not examine is the earnings/price ratio. Earnings price ratios have several drawbacks
for our purposes. First, earnings/price is not as strong a predictor of month-ahead
stock returns as book/market (see, e.g., Fama and French (1996)), suggesting that it
is a less accurate measure of mispricing. Second, short-term earnings ﬂuctuations will
tend to shift earnings/price even if the degree of misvaluation is unchanged. Third, and
relatedly, negative earnings are more common than negative book values, leading more
frequently to negative values of earnings/price.
The residual income model has at least two important advantages over book value
as a fundamental measure. First, it is designed to be invariant to accounting treatments
(to the extent that the ‘clean surplus’ accounting identity obtains; see Ohlson (1995)),
making V=P less sensitive to such choices. Second, in addition to the backward-looking
information contained in book value, it also reﬂects analyst forecasts of future earnings.
On the other hand, if analyst forecasts are infected with biases that are correlated
with market misperceptions, the residual income value may share some of the misvalua-
tion contained in market price. This could arise if investors are misled by strategic biases
in analysts’ forecasts, or if analysts and investors are subject to common psychological
biases. The cancellation of common biases can weaken V=P as a proxy for misvaluation.
This biases the results of tests using V=P toward ﬁnding no eﬀect.
These considerations— the high extraneous variation in B=P as an indicator of
mispricing, and the possibility of partial cancellation of mispricing in the V=P measure—
suggest that either proxy may give an incorrect null result even if misvaluation drives
the takeover market. Furthermore, B=P can proxy for extraneous eﬀects such as growth
opportunities or managerial discipline. Since neither measure is perfect, it is informative
to include both B=P and V=P measures of misvaluation in our tests.
In our sample, the correlation of B=P with V=P is fairly low— 0.33 for bidders
and 0.20 for targets. Thus, V=P potentially oﬀers useful independent information be-
yond B=P regarding misvaluation. This is to be expected, as much of the variation in
book/market arises from diﬀerences in growth opportunities or in managerial discipline
that do not necessarily correspond to misvaluation.
Turning to procedure, we calculate the B=P proxy as the ratio of book value of
equity to market value of equity. Each month for each stock, book equity is measured
at the end of the prior ﬁscal year, using the deﬁnition as in Baker and Wurgler (2002).
relative to publicly available information. We therefore calculate our misvaluation proxies solely using
contemporaneous information (current price, book value, and analyst forecasts).
16Market value of equity is measured at the end of the month.
Our estimation procedure for V=P is similar to that of Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan
(1999). For each stock in month t, we estimate the residual income model (RIM) price,
denoted by V (t). With the assumption of “clean surplus” accounting, which states that
the change in book value of equity equals earnings minus dividends, the intrinsic value
of ﬁrm stock can be written as the book value plus the discounted value of an inﬁnite
sum of expected residual incomes (see Ohlson (1995)),
V (t) = B(t) +
1 X
i=1
Et[fROE(t + i) ¡ re(t)g B(t + i ¡ 1)]
[1 + re(t)]i ;
where Et is the expectations operator, B(t) is the book value of equity at time t (negative
B(t) observations are deleted), ROE(t + i) is the return on equity for period t + i, and
re(t) is the ﬁrm’s annualized cost of equity capital.
For practical purposes, the above inﬁnite sum needs to be replaced by a ﬁnite series
of T ¡1 periods, plus an estimate of the terminal value beyond period T. This terminal
value is estimated by viewing the period T residual income as a perpetuity. Lee, Myers,
and Swaminathan (1999) report that the quality of their V (t) estimates was not sensitive
to the choice of the forecast horizon beyond three years. The residual income valuations
are also likely to be less sensitive to errors in terminal value estimates than in a dividend
discounting model; pre-terminal values include book value, so that terminal values are
based on residual earnings rather than full earnings (or dividends).20 Of course, the
residual income V (t) cannot perfectly capture growth, so our misvaluation proxy V=P
does not perfectly ﬁlter out growth eﬀects. However, since V reﬂects forward-looking
earnings forecasts, a large portion of the growth eﬀects contained in B=P should be
ﬁltered out of V=P.
We use a three-period forecast horizon:
V (t) = B(t) +
[fROE(t + 1) ¡ re(t)]B(t)
1 + re(t)
+
[fROE(t + 2) ¡ re(t)]B(t + 1)
[1 + re(t)]2
+
[fROE(t + 3) ¡ re(t)]B(t + 2)
[1 + re(t)]2 re(t)
; (1)
where fROE(t + i) is the forecasted return on equity for period t + i, the length of a
period is one year, and where the last term discounts the period t + 3 residual income
20For example, D’Mello and Shrof (2000) found that in their sample of repurchasing ﬁrms, ﬁrms’
terminal value was on average 11% of their total residual income value, whereas using a dividend
discount model the terminal value was 58% of total value.
17as a perpetuity.21
Forecasted ROE’s are computed as
f
ROE(t + i) =
fEPS(t + i)
¯ B(t + i ¡ 1)
; where ¯ B(t + i ¡ 1) ´
B(t + i ¡ 1) + B(t + i ¡ 2)
2
;
and where fEPS(t+i) is the forecasted EPS for period t+i.22 We require that each of
these fROE’s be less than 1.
Future book values of equity are computed as
B(t + i) = B(t + i ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ k)f
EPS(t + i);





and D(t) and EPS(t) are respectively the dividend and EPS for period t. Following Lee,
Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), if k < 0 (owing to negative EPS), we divide dividends
by (0.06 £ total assets) to derive an estimate of the payout ratio, i.e., we assume that
earnings are on average 6% of total assets. Observations in which the computed k is
greater than 1 are deleted from the study.
The annualized cost of equity, re(t), is determined as a ﬁrm-speciﬁc rate using the
CAPM, where the time-t beta is estimated using the trailing ﬁve years (or, if there is
not enough data, at least two years) of monthly return data. The market risk premium
assumed in the CAPM is the average annual premium over the riskfree rate for the
CRSP value-weighted index over the preceding 30 years. Any estimate of the CAPM
cost of capital that is outside the range of 3%-30% (less than 1% of our estimates) is
winsorized to lie at the border of the range. Previous studies have reported that the
predictive ability of V=P was robust to the cost of capital model used (Lee, Myers, and
Swaminathan (1999)) and to whether the discount rate was allowed to vary across ﬁrms
(D’Mello and Shrof (2000)). We checked the robustness of our main ﬁndings using the
alternative constant discount rate of 12.5% (following D’Mello and Shrof (2000)). The
21Following Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and D’Mello and Shrof (2000), in calculating the
terminal value component of V we assume that expected residual earnings remain constant after year
3, so that the discount rate for the perpetuity is the ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital.
22If the EPS forecast for any horizon is not available, it is substituted by the EPS forecast for the
previous horizon and compounded at the long-term growth rate (as provided by I/B/E/S). If the long-
term growth rate is not available from I/B/E/S, the EPS forecast for the ﬁrst preceding available
horizon is used as a surrogate for fEPS(t + i).
18results were similar to those reported here. Finally, V=P is winsorized at the 1% and
99% tails.
To measure the misvaluation of acquirers and targets, we use values of B=P and V=P
of the month prior to the acquisition announcement, to ensure that information needed
for calculating the ratios are available before the announcement. The benchmark for fair
valuation is not equal to 1 for either ratio, for two reasons. First, book is an historical
value that does not reﬂect growth. Second, residual income model valuations have been
found to be too low on average. Thus, our tests consider relative comparisons these mis-
valuation proxies: higher (lower) values of B=P or V=P indicate relative undervaluation
(overvaluation).
3.2 Announcement Period Returns
Announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed for the three-
day period (-1,1) around the announcement date (day 0). Following Fuller, Netter, and
Stegemoller (2002), we employ a modiﬁed market model,
CARi = ri ¡ rm;
where ri is the ﬁrm-i return and rm is the CRSP value-weighted market return, over the
three-day period around the acquisition announcement.
4 Univariate Tests
Table 1 reports descriptive information for our 1978-2000 sample of takeover bids. As
observers have often noted, there is clear evidence of cyclical patterns in acquisition
activity. The number of transactions peaks in the middle of the 1980s and the latter
portion of the 1990s. The average transaction value has increased toward the end of
the sample period. Acquisitions were more likely to be successful in later years, and
more recent acquisitions tend to be mergers. Prior to the 1990s there were more hostile
oﬀers and tender oﬀers. The acquisition wave of the 1990s was characterized by an
increased frequency of stock as a means of payment (see e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and
Staﬀord (2001) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001)). The average bid premium is 34.4%
for the entire sample, and the mean abnormal return is 17.9% for target ﬁrms at the
announcement of the oﬀer.23
23These ﬁndings are similar to those of Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001), who report a median
bid premium of 37.9% and mean target announcement abnormal returns of 16% in their takeover sample
19We next discuss whether the univariate evidence supports the misvaluation or Q
hypotheses. (We discuss the Q hypothesis only for those takeover characteristics for
which it oﬀers predictions.) We do not stress possible leverage-related explanations
for our ﬁndings, because the multivariate ﬁndings (discussed in Section 5) control for
leverage and are broadly similar, with a few exceptions noted there.
Table 2 reports how under- or over- valuation is related to the acquisition mode and
means of payment. Mean values of B=P and V=P, and their diﬀerences between acquirer
and target ﬁrms are reported across modes of acquisition and methods of payment.24
In Table 2 bidding ﬁrms on average tend to have lower values for B=P and V=P
than target ﬁrms, indicating that bidders are overvalued relative to targets. The average
B=P (V=P) ratio for acquirers is 0.580 (0.704) and for target ﬁrms is 0.678 (0.790). The
pairwise diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with Prediction
1.i of the misvaluation hypothesis.25
The B=P ﬁnding extends that of Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001) and Jo-
vanovic and Rousseau (2002), who conditioned upon oﬀer success. Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002) propose a special case of the Q hypothesis in which takeovers are
generally value-increasing (thereby ruling out, for example, takeovers involving overin-
vestment of free cash ﬂow). Our ﬁnding and theirs are consistent with this Panglossian
version of the Q approach as well as with the misvaluation hypothesis. However, more
generally the Q approach (as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991))
does not specify whether good or bad transactions predominate, and is therefore am-
biguous in its prediction about relative bidder and target valuations.
Prediction 1.i more speciﬁcally asserts that bidder B=P and V=P are lower than
target B=P and V=P among each of cash and equity oﬀers. This prediction is conﬁrmed.
For the 766 (362) cash transactions for which we are able to calculate B=P (V=P), the
bidder/target B=P (V=P) diﬀerential is -0.112 (-0.058), highly signiﬁcant for B=P but
only marginal for V=P. Among the 1246 (753) stock oﬀers, the bidder/target B=P
(V=P) diﬀerential is -0.140 (-0.122), highly signiﬁcant for both measures.
Prediction 1.ii asserts that this diﬀerential will be more negative for equity than
for cash oﬀers. The misvaluation prediction is supported for V=P, p < 0:05, but the
during 1973-98.
24Median values suggest similar inferences and are not reported. In addition, Table 2 restricts the
sample to observations where B=P and V=P are available for both bidder and target ﬁrms.
25Subsample analysis indicates that these ﬁndings apply only within the post-1990 period. On the
other hand, in a sample of 50 successful mergers in the 1950s, Gort (1969) found that acquirers on
average had higher price-earnings ratios than their targets (signiﬁcant in a sign test, though not at the
5% level in Gort’s parametric test).
20B=P diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant, t = 0:95 (tests not reported in table). These
ﬁndings lend some support to the misvaluation hypothesis.
Prediction 1.iii asserts that in both merger bids and tender oﬀers, bidders will be
overvalued relative to their targets. This prediction is also generally conﬁrmed. For
the 2,308 (1,226) merger transactions for which we are able to calculate B=P (V=P),
the bidder/target B=P (V=P) diﬀerential is -0.094 (-0.103), highly signiﬁcant. Among
the 608 (321) tender oﬀers, the bidder/target B=P (V=P) diﬀerential is -0.114 (-0.021),
highly signiﬁcant for B=P, and insigniﬁcant for V=P.
Table 2 also indicates, consistent with an immediate corollary of Prediction 2.i, that
the targets of cash oﬀers are signiﬁcantly more undervalued than the targets of stock
oﬀers; V=P = 0:833 for cash versus 0.756 for stock (diﬀerence signiﬁcant with t = 2:55).
(This ﬁnding derives primarily from merger bids.) Intuitively, bidders can sometimes
detect target misvaluation, and are more prone to paying stock for overvalued targets
in order to rest part of this overvaluation upon the shoulders of target shareholders.
Finally, consistent with an immediate corollary of Prediction 3.i, Table 2 indicates
that stock bidders are on average more overvalued than cash bidders, using both B=P
and V=P measures; V=P = 0:775 for cash versus 0.634 for stock (diﬀerence signiﬁcant
with t = 6:07). This is consistent with the hypothesis that overvalued bidders prefer to
acquire target resources using their overpriced stock as a currency, and the prediction
of Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
Table 3 analyzes how the characteristics of takeover bids are related to contempora-
neous measures of bidder and target misvaluation (B=P, V=P). Panels A and B report
the eﬀects of target misvaluation; Panels C and D describe the eﬀects of acquirer mis-
valuation. In each month, we rank ﬁrms based on their respective misvaluation ratios
and form quintiles. This monthly sorting procedure ensures that any eﬀects we identify
are cross-sectional, and therefore are not driven by time-series swings in valuations and
takeover characteristics.
We refer to quintile 1, in which overvaluation is highest and V=P and B=P are
lowest relative to other ﬁrms in the same category (other bidders, or other targets),
as the top overvaluation quintile; quintile 5, which contains high values of B=P or
V=P, indicate the strongest undervaluation. We report diﬀerences across the top and
bottom overvaluation quintiles (OMU, overvalued minus undervalued) to describe how
misvaluation is related to transaction characteristics. The characteristics we consider are
the use of cash versus stock, tender oﬀer versus merger bid, oﬀer success versus failure,
hostility versus friendliness of the oﬀer, the level of the bid premium, and announcement
21period stock returns.26
Panels A and B report statistics for target ﬁrms. If target ﬁrms are resistant to selling
when they are undervalued, the bidder may seek to circumvent target management and
consummate swiftly by means of a cash tender oﬀer (Prediction 2.i). Consistent with
this prediction, stock is much less likely to be used as method of payment when the
target is undervalued (22.6% quintile diﬀerence in probability (B=P); 17.6% (V=P)),
both highly signiﬁcant.
Partially consistent with this reasoning, target overvaluation reduces the probability
of a cash oﬀer, but only with the B=P measure. The quintile diﬀerences in the probability
of cash oﬀers are -12.4% (B=P) and -6.3% (V=P; signiﬁcant only at 10% level). These
quintile results suggest that cash targets are less overvalued than equity targets.
Furthermore, consistent with Prediction 2.ii, a transaction is more likely to be hostile
when the target is more undervalued (quintile diﬀerence in probability of -7.9% (B=P)
or -5.6% (V=P)). Consistent with Prediction 2.iii, a transaction is more likely to take
the form of tender oﬀer rather than merger bid when the target is more undervalued
(quintile diﬀerence in probability of -8.3% (B=P) or -7.4% (V=P)). There is also evi-
dence, consistent with Prediction 2.iv that an oﬀer is less likely to be successful when
the target is undervalued (the quintile diﬀerence in probability is 9.3% (B=P) or 6.0%
(V=P)).27 Together, these ﬁndings suggest that more undervalued targets are more re-
sistant to takeovers (consistent with the prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (2003)), and
ﬁght hard either for a higher price or to block the transaction entirely.
Consistent with Prediction 2.vi, bidder announcement returns are substantially lower
when targets are more overvalued by our measures. The quintile diﬀerence for bidder
CAR is -1.4% (-1.8%) for B=P (V=P). Furthermore, as predicted by the hypothesis,
this eﬀect derives primarily from stock acquisitions, which have quintile diﬀerences of
-1.7% (-2.1%) (not reported in table).28 The B=P results are consistent with the Q
hypothesis (or agency) prediction as well, since there is less room to improve a well-run
target. However, the Q hypothesis does not explain the concentration of the eﬀect in
equity acquisitions.
Consistent with Predictions 2.v and 5 respectively, there is evidence that bid premia
26We occasionally discuss subsample ﬁndings not contained in the tables when there are diﬀerences
in eﬀects within subsamples such as cash versus equity, or merger versus tender oﬀer. Such subsample
ﬁndings must of course be interpreted with caution when categorizing based upon a dependent variable,
except to the extent that theory explicitly oﬀers predictions based on such categories.
27Schwert (2000) provides related ﬁndings in a 1975-96 sample period.
28Servaes (1991) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)) report evidence that, conditional on sub-
sequent oﬀer success, bidder gains are lower when the target has a high Q or is rapidly-growing.
22and target announcement period returns are on average higher for more undervalued
targets.29 This suggests that takeover bids on average tend to correct target mispricing.
The quintile diﬀerence for bid premium is -8.5% (-2.8%) for B=P (V=P insigniﬁcant)
and the quintile diﬀerence for target CAR is -4.3% (-2.6%). The B=P ﬁndings are also
consistent with the Q hypothesis, since the value of bad targets can be improved the
most and this gain can be shared with target shareholders.
Some consistent patterns emerge for bidding ﬁrms from Panels C and D. The prob-
ability of stock payment is strongly related to our misvaluation measures. Bidders that
are more overvalued are more likely to use stock as consideration, consistent with Predic-
tion 3.i and the prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). The diﬀerence in probability
of using stock between the top and bottom overvaluation quintiles is 14.8% (V=P) or
25.9% (B=P). An associated ﬁnding is that undervalued acquirers are more likely to use
cash as consideration. The diﬀerence in the fraction of cash oﬀers between the top and
bottom misvaluation quintiles is -5.6% (V=P) and -14.1% (B=P). The B=P ﬁndings are
consistent with the 1978-1988 evidence of Martin (1996) and the 1980-1991 evidence of
Rau and Vermaelen (1998), who ﬁnd that, conditioning upon subsequent oﬀer success,
low bidder B=P (or high Q) is associated with equity rather than cash or mixed oﬀers.
There is some evidence that, consistent with Prediction 3.ii, overvalued acquirers pay
higher bid premia, especially when the form of consideration is stock. Using the B=P
measure in Panel C the quintile diﬀerence in premium is 4.6% for the whole sample and
(not reported in the table) 8.7% for stock acquisitions, signiﬁcant diﬀerences. There is
no signiﬁcant eﬀect for V=P in Panel D. The signiﬁcant ﬁndings for B=P suggest that
overvalued bidders either ﬁnd it easier to raise enough capital to make a high bid, and/or
are more willing to make a high bid using an overvalue currency, their stock.
There is also some evidence, consistent with Prediction 3.iii, that oﬀers by more
overvalued bidders are associated with higher target stock returns. This eﬀect is also
much stronger among stock bids than in the entire sample. In Panel C, the B=P quintile
diﬀerence in premium is 2.3% for the whole sample (signiﬁcant at the 10% level), and
(not reported in the table) 5.9% for stock acquisitions (highly signiﬁcant). In contrast,
the older samples of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) indicated that
(conditioning on subsequent oﬀer success), there was no signiﬁcant relation between
bidder Q and target return. In Panel D V=P has essentially no eﬀect; among stock oﬀers
(not reported in table) there is an economically substantial but statistically insigniﬁcant
quintile diﬀerence of 3.0%.
29In an early sample, Walkling and Edmister (1985) report that target B=P is related to premium.
23Under the Q hypothesis, high valuation bidders create greater total gains which are in
part shared with targets. Thus, the ﬁndings that lower acquirer B=P is associated with
higher bid premia and target stock returns are also consistent with the Q hypothesis.
However, the Q hypothesis does not predict that such eﬀects are stronger in equity
acquisitions.
Despite the indication that among stock oﬀers, more overvalued bidders pay higher
premia, there is no evidence that targets are more likely to view oﬀers from overvalued
bidders as friendly, nor that such oﬀers have a greater probability of success. This is
reasonable if target management understands that the bidder is overvalued. If so, then
a higher premium in a stock oﬀer is necessary merely to compensate for the fact that
the market value of the oﬀered shares is inﬂated relative to fundamental value.
Mean acquirer announcement period returns are signiﬁcantly more negative when the
acquirer is more overvalued based on both misvaluation measures. We call the strategy
that is long on the top overvaluation quintile and short on the bottom overvaluation
quintile the overvaluation-minus-undervaluation or OMU portfolio. The OMU portfolio
abnormal return (describing the quintile diﬀerence in acquirer CARs) is -1.6% (B=P)
or -1.9% (V=P). For B=P the eﬀect derives from the stock and merger subsamples; for
V=P the eﬀect is strong with both stock and cash subsamples, and both merger and
tender oﬀer sub-samples (not reported in tables).
These substantial and highly signiﬁcant return diﬀerentials are consistent with Pre-
diction 4. This suggests that the announcement of a takeover bid tends to alert investors
to preexisting mispricing, thereby causing a partial correction. This evidence is in sharp
conﬂict with the Q hypothesis, which predicts that a well-run bidder can generate greater
gains from takeover.
As alluded to earlier, studies on earlier samples on Tobin’s Q variables (which tend
to be inversely related to B=P) found very diﬀerent results, that higher bidder valuation
was associated with higher bidder returns. Our overall B=P ﬁnding contrasts with the
evidence, based on proxies for Tobin’s Q in a sample of successful mergers and tender
oﬀers from 1972-87 of Servaes (1991). Our ﬁnding within the tender oﬀer subsample of
no signiﬁcant relation between acquirer B=P ratios and announcement period acquirer
returns (with a point estimate indicating low returns for bidders with low B=P) contrasts
with the ﬁndings for successful tender oﬀers of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) (from
1968-86); see also footnote 13.
Overall, as indicated in the Appendix Table, the univariate analysis oﬀers strong
support for the misvaluation hypothesis based on both B=P and V=P measures. The Q
24hypothesis does not make predictions for V=P, and only a relatively few predictions for
B=P. Several B=P ﬁndings also tend to support the Q hypothesis. However, where the
two theories are directly opposed in their predictions (about the relation between bidder
B=P and bidder event-date returns), the results supports the misvaluation hypothesis
and opposes the Q hypothesis. The univariate evidence therefore supports the propo-
sition that market misvaluation inﬂuences the behavior of both targets and bidders in
takeover contests.
5 Multivariate Tests
To assess the robustness of our univariate ﬁndings, we perform multivariate analysis with
additional controls described in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 summarizes logistic regressions
relating bidder and target misvaluation to the means of payment and to the mode and
mood of the oﬀer. The dependent variables we consider are: (1) cash payment, (2) stock
payment, (3) tender oﬀer, (4) hostility, and (5) success.
To ensure that our results concerning misvaluation do not result from low-frequency
time-series swings, in the multivariate regressions in Tables 4 and 5, bidder and target
B=P and V=P are ranked each month among all CRSP stocks and assigned a value
between 1 and 100, somewhat along the lines of Frankel and Lee (1998). In all regressions
we include size variables, leverage, year, and industry as controls. The industry controls
are bidder 2-digit SIC major industry dummies as deﬁned by Moskowitz and Grinblatt
(1999).
We report three regression speciﬁcations for each dependent variable. First, we
regress on bidder and target B=P ranks. Second, we regress on bidder and target V=P.
Third, we include both B=P and V=P ranks to examine whether there is incremental
explanatory power from V=P as a misvaluation measure given B=P. If so, this provides a
fairly stringent conﬁrmation that the identiﬁed eﬀect is a result of misvaluation, rather
than other economic factors possibly captured by book/market, such as risk premia,
growth opportunities, or the degree of managerial discipline.
Our inclusion of leverage as a control distinguishes the misvaluation hypothesis from
the ﬁnancing constraint/debt capacity hypothesis. As in the preceding section, we only
discuss the Q hypothesis when it oﬀers a prediction.
Consistent with Prediction 2.i, greater target overvaluation is associated with the
use of stock as a means of payment (both B=P and V=P). Similarly, the use of of
25cash is associated with target undervaluation (B=P); the eﬀect for target V=P does not
withstand inclusion of B=P in the regression.
According to the misvaluation hypothesis, a target manager who understands that
his ﬁrm is undervalued has an incentive to ﬁght hard either to block the oﬀer or to drive
up the price. This in turn increases the incentive of the bidder to bypass management
through a tender oﬀer, as in Prediction 2.ii. Table 4 indicates that undervalued targets,
as measured by B=P, do indeed have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of opposing the
oﬀer (i.e. the frequency of hostile oﬀers is higher). Furthermore, a similar relationship
holds in a regression with target V=P (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). However, when both
variables are included together, the B=P remains whereas the incremental V=P eﬀect
is close to zero. Thus, V=P does not capture any misvaluation eﬀect on hostility above
and beyond that captured by B=P.
Table 4 also indicates that tender oﬀers are signiﬁcantly less likely (both B=P and
V=P) when the measured overvaluation of targets is greater. This ﬁnding for B=P is
consistent with Prediction 2.iii of the misvaluation hypothesis.
Table 4 further indicates that target undervaluation, when measured by B=P but
not V=P, reduces the probability of oﬀer success. Intuitively, bidders for undervalued
targets have an incentive to try to get by with bids below true target value. This
should provoke greater opposition by the target to the oﬀer (consistent with the evidence
discussed above), reducing the probability of success. The B=P ﬁnding is consistent with
Prediction 2.iv, but the lack of a V=P eﬀect does not support Prediction 2.iv.
Table 4 indicates that bidders with high measured overvaluation are more likely to
pay with stock, and less likely to pay cash, consistent with Predictions 3.i of the misval-
uation hypothesis and the prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (2003).30 The coeﬃcients
on acquirer B=P in both the cash and stock regressions are signiﬁcantly positive and
negative respectively.31 Furthermore, the acquirer V=P variables also have signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients. The V=P ﬁnding suggests that even in a test that stringently ﬁlters out
growth-related eﬀects, bidder overvaluation promotes the use of equity.
Greater bidder overvaluation (measured inversely by either B=P or V=P) makes
tender oﬀers signiﬁcantly less likely. The misvaluation hypothesis does not make a
prediction in this regard, but a possible interpetation of this ﬁnding is that overvalued
30To make the regressions comparable, we impose the condition that data for both B=P and V=P be
available. The results are generally similar if we expand the sample to include all ﬁrms for which data
for B=P are available in the regressions that do not involve V=P.
31The B=P ﬁndings extend the evidence of Martin (1996) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) about the
relation of B=P to the use of equity conditional upon subsequent oﬀer success.
26bidders tend to use equity, which is rarely used in tender oﬀers. There is little relation
between estimated bidder overvaluation and either hostility or probability of success.
Again, the misvaluation hypothesis is ambiguous with respect to this relation.
Table 5 examines whether misvaluation measures are related to bidder and target
returns and the bid premium, after controlling for relative sizes of bidder and target,
leverage, year, and industry as in Table 4. Consistent with Prediction 2.v, bid premia
tend to be higher for targets that are more undervalued by both our measures. In
contrast with the univariate results, the eﬀect in the multivariate analysis is highly
signiﬁcant for V=P as well as B=P. Intuitively, undervalued targets are prepared to ﬁght
harder for a high premium relative to market value. The B=P eﬀect is also consistent
with the Q hypothesis. However, the V=P ﬁnding suggests that misvaluation is involved,
rather than solely asset reallocation or agency eﬀects.
In contrast with the univariate results, there is no signiﬁcant relation between bidder
announcement period returns and target overvaluation. This lack of an eﬀect fails to
support either Prediction 2.vi or the Q hypothesis (or agency) prediction (see, e.g., Lang,
Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991), and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990))
that bidder gains are lower when acquiring well-run or rapidly-growing targets.
There is a weak negative relation between bidder B=P and the bid premium. The
conﬁdence level is p < :10 when only B=P is included in the regression, and is p = :12
when both B=P and V=P are included. This relation becomes signiﬁcant at the 1% level
within the stock oﬀer subsample (in which the misvaluation eﬀect should be strongest;
not reported in tables). This evidence is generally consistent with Prediction 3.ii of the
misvaluation hypothesis that more overvalued bidders oﬀer higher premia. However, the
results for V=P are insigniﬁcant. The B=P ﬁndings are also generally consistent with
the Q hypothesis, because bidders that generate high total gains share part of gains with
their targets.
Prediction 3.iii of the misvaluation hypothesis is that overvalued bidders, by oﬀering
more, provide higher announcement returns to targets. In contrast with the somewhat
mixed univariate evidence, the multivariate evidence fails to support this prediction.
Bidder overvaluation is generally unrelated to target announcement period returns. The
exception is that in the regression that contains V=P but not B=P, acquirer V=P has
a positive eﬀect that reaches signiﬁcance at the 5% level, which opposes the prediction.
The lack of a B=P relation also fails to support the Q hypothesis.
Bidder announcement period returns are greater for more undervalued bidders (for
both B=P and V=P measures), consistent with Prediction 4 and directly opposed to the
27B=P prediction of the Q hypothesis. These ﬁndings contrast with evidence, discussed
in Section 4, from older studies based on diﬀerent time periods and somewhat diﬀerent
empirical measures; see also footnote 13. In a 1980-2001 sample of public acquisitions,
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003a) ﬁnd essentially no relation between Tobin’s
Q and the bidder’s announcement period return. The diﬀering conclusions may derive
from their conditioning of returns on subsequent success of the oﬀer, our longer sample
period, or diﬀerences in control variables and in valuation proxies.32
As with the univariate evidence, these are highly signiﬁcant eﬀects. This evidence
suggests that the act of takeover bidding tends to have a corrective eﬀect on the mis-
valuation of the bidder. Apparently, investors tend to view an oﬀer by an undervalued
bidders as a masterful stroke, and an oﬀer by an overvalued bidder as a clumsy blunder.
Overall, as indicated in the Appendix Table, the multivariate analysis generally fur-
ther supports the misvaluation hypothesis based on both B=P and V=P measures. Since
B=P contains some incremental information about misvaluation, it is not surprising that
overall the conﬁrmation of the predicted ﬁndings for V=P becomes a bit weaker. Nev-
ertheless, a wide range of predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis are conﬁrmed, and
there is no signiﬁcant ﬁnding in opposition. Several B=P ﬁndings also support the Q
hypothesis. However, as with the univariate analysis, where the two theories directly
disagree in their predictions (about the relation of bidder misvaluation to bidder re-
turns), the results support the misvaluation hypothesis and oppose the Q hypothesis.
Overall, the multivariate evidence more strongly supports the proposition that market
misvaluation inﬂuences the behavior of both targets and bidders in takeover contests.
6 Summary and Conclusion
We have examined the misvaluation hypothesis— that ineﬃcient stock market misvalu-
ation is an important driver of the takeover market— using contemporaneous measures
of misvaluation of bidders and targets: book/price (B=P), and the ratio of residual
income valuation to price (V=P). The V=P variable allows us to determine whether a
relation between market valuations and takeover characteristics is due to mispricing or
to extraneous eﬀects deriving from growth opportunities or the quality of bidder and
target managements.
32Since bidders with low B=P (documented here) and high Q (Martin (1996)) tend to pay with equity,
and since equity bidders for public ﬁrms tend to earn lower abnormal returns (Travlos (1987), Brown
and Ryngaert (1991), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)), our ﬁnding is compatible with some other
available evidence.
28Several empirical patterns emerge. With one or both measures, bidders are overval-
ued relative to their targets in both cash and equity oﬀers, and in both mergers and
tender oﬀers. More overvalued bidders are more likely to use stock and less likely to
use cash as consideration, are willing to pay more relative to target market price, are
less inclined to use tender oﬀer rather than merger bid, and earn lower announcement
period returns. Undervalued targets receive higher premia relative to market price, are
more likely to be hostile to the oﬀer, are more likely to receive tender oﬀers rather than
merger bids, have a lower probability of being successfully acquired, and earn higher
announcement period returns.
These ﬁndings are generally supportive of the misvaluation hypothesis. The Q hy-
pothesis oﬀers a narrower range of predictions about bid premium and about bidder and
target returns. The evidence provides mixed support for these predictions. In the case
where the predictions of the two hypotheses are directly opposed, the ﬁndings support
the misvaluation hypothesis. This evidence does not rule out the possibility of important
growth/agency eﬀects. However, taken as a whole, the evidence more strongly supports
the proposition that ineﬃcient mispricing of the stocks of targets and bidders inﬂuences
their takeover-related decisions.
These ﬁndings raise the question of whether misvaluation drives aggregate patterns
of takeover activity as well. Some recent papers examine aggregate valuation and the
takeover market (Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2003), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and
Teoh (2002), Verter (2003)). These papers conﬁrm that there are long-term swings in
market valuations and in aggregate takeover activity, and have oﬀered some independent
support for the misvaluation hypothesis. A challenge for this literature is that the
eﬀective sample size is reduced by the low frequency of merger waves. Furthermore,
aggregate misvaluation measures mix the eﬀects of bidder and target mispricing. The
cross-sectional tests we oﬀer here ﬁlter away any eﬀects of aggregate valuations, and
disentangle the eﬀects of bidder versus target misvaluation. Our tests are therefore
complementary with those of these papers.
There is no reason to believe that the inﬂuence of market misvaluation on managerial
decisions is limited to the takeover market. As discussed earlier, previous research has
provided evidence that ﬁnancing, repurchase, reporting, and investment decisions are
related to misvaluation. Thus, our evidence contributes to an emerging theme in recent
literature that misvaluation is likely to be important for many of the decisions that ﬁrms
make.
This body of evidence presents a challenge to the traditional theory of corporate
29ﬁnance, which is premised upon the eﬃcient markets hypothesis. There have been some
initial steps toward incorporating misvaluation into the theory of takeover transactions
(see Shleifer and Vishny (2003)), ﬁnancing, and investment decisions (see Stein (1996)
and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)). The emerging indications that
misvaluation has important eﬀects suggest that further theoretical analysis of how ﬁrms
can exploit misvaluation may be fruitful.
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Descriptive Statistics for Takeover Bids   
 
Number of takeover bids, mean value of transaction, and percentage of transactions that are successful, hostile, 
tender offers, merger bids, all cash payment, all stock payment, and mixed payment, by calendar year. Sample 
includes merger bids and tender offers where both acquirer and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or 






















1978  17  1046.7 76.5 23.5 29.4 70.6 52.9 47.1  0.0 
1979  11  981.1  63.6 10.0 27.3 72.7 90.9  9.1  0.0 
1980  29  872.5  75.9 11.5 24.1 75.9 20.7  3.4  75.9 
1981  99  1509.1 60.6 13.1 23.2 76.8  6.1  0.0  93.9 
1982  89  624.3  68.5 18.0 28.1 71.9  0.0  0.0 100.0 
1983 105  644.0  70.5 11.7 20.0 80.0  4.8  0.0  95.2 
1984 120  840.2  61.7 11.0 31.7 68.3 17.5  5.8  76.7 
1985 157  1031.5 67.5 15.3 33.1 66.9 45.9 31.2 22.9 
1986 139  813.5  67.6 15.4 31.7 68.3 52.5 26.6 20.9 
1987 167  695.5  66.5 13.4 21.0 79.0 40.1 28.1 31.7 
1988 161  630.2  55.3 15.2 35.4 64.6 61.5 21.7 16.8 
1989 128  972.0  64.1 13.4 30.5 69.5 39.8 38.3 21.9 
1990  74  710.5  73.0  7.6  16.2 83.8 35.1 37.8 27.0 
1991  85  491.4  78.8  3.7  10.6 89.4 10.6 61.2 28.2 
1992  97  423.3  81.4  3.1  5.2  94.8 16.5 62.9 20.6 
1993 120  1101.6 85.8  2.6  10.8 89.2 26.7 47.5 25.8 
1994 206  585.2  80.6  7.3  14.6 85.4 29.6 54.9 15.5 
1995 248  827.4  84.3  7.3  14.1 85.9 25.0 58.9 16.1 
1996 264  1126.1 84.8  7.2  14.4 85.6 23.9 50.4 25.8 
1997 366  1197.6 87.7  4.2  16.4 83.6 16.4 54.9 28.7 
1998 342  2982.8 89.5  2.4  12.9 87.1 16.1 57.3 26.6 
1999 394  3064.5 84.0  3.9  17.0 83.0 24.1 46.2 29.7 
2000 314  2951.1 85.7  2.3  20.1 79.9 25.5 48.1 26.4 




Table 2  
Mean Acquirer and Target Valuation Ratios by Mode of the Offer and Payment Method 
 
The valuation ratios are the book-price ratio B/P and the intrinsic value-price ratio V/P. The intrinsic value is estimated using the residual income model (RIM) when the 
discount rate is based on firm-specific CAPM.  T-statistic of differences between acquirer and target, and between cash and stock offers are reported in parentheses. For 
each valuation ratio, we require that both the acquirer and the target have non-missing values.  Sample includes both successful and unsuccessful merger bids and tender 
offers where both acquirer and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1978-2000. 
 













– Target  
 (t-stat) 
N Acquirer Target 
Acquirer 
– Target  
 (t-stat) 
N 
Cash    B/P  0.589  0.742  -0.153 
(-3.68)  379   0.727
  0.799
   -0.072 
(-1.97)  387 0.659    0.771
   -0.112 
(-4.05)  766 
    V/P  0.764  0.815  -0.051 
(-1.49)  214   0.792
  0.859
   -0.068 
(-1.57)  148 0.775
  0.833
   -0.058 
(-2.15)  362 
                             
Stock    B/P  0.591  0.755  -0.164 
(-1.26)  19  0.409
  0.549
   -0.140 
(-12.09)  1227 0.412    0.552
   -0.140 
(-12.14)  1246 
    V/P  0.682  0.660  0.022 
(0.26)  17   0.6423  0.758
   -0.125 
(-7.50)  736 0.634  0.756    -0.122 
(-7.41)  753 
                             
Mixed    B/P  0.821  0.862  -0.040 
(-0.74)  210   0.722  0.747  -0.025 
(-0.29)  694 0.745  0.774  -0.028 
(-0.42)  904 
    V/P  0.800  0.757  0.043 
(0.89)  90  0.757  0.827  -0.070 
(-2.45)  342 0.766  0.813  -0.047 
(-1.87)  432 
                             
All    B/P  0.669  0.784  -0.114 
(-3.55)  608   0.556  0.650  -0.094 
(-3.46)  2308 0.580  0.678  -0.098 
(-4.35)  2916 
    V/P  0.770  0.791  -0.021 
(-0.77)  321   0.686  0.790  -0.103 
(-7.43)  1226 0.704  0.790  -0.086 
(-6.95)  1547 
                              
        Acquirer   Target         Acquirer  Target       Acquirer  Target      
Cash - Stock    B/P   -0.001 -0.013       0.318 0.250     0.247 0.219    
(t-stat)       (-0.01)  (-0.10)       (11.19)  (7.94)      (11.75)  (8.10)    
Cash - Stock    V/P  0.082 0.155       0.159 0.102     0.142 0.078    
(t-stat)        (1.29) (1.91)       (4.73)  (2.33)      (6.07) (2.55)     
 
 
 Table 3  
Mean Acquisition Characteristics by Acquirer or Target Valuation Ratio Quintiles 
 
Each month, acquirer and target firms are separately ranked on valuation ratios (B/P and V/P) into quintiles and are assigned a rank between 1 and 5, with 1 being the 
lowest ratio quintile (most overvalued). B/P is the book-price ratio. V/P is the intrinsic value-price ratio, where the intrinsic value is estimated using the residual income 
model (RIM) when the discount rate is based on firm-specific CAPM. This table reports mean acquisition characteristics for each of the quintiles and difference in means 
between ranks 1 and 5. Bid premium is the ratio of the bid price offered by the acquirer to the target stock price 5 days prior to the announcement of the takeover bid. 
Acquirer and target cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are measured over the three days (-1,1) around the announcement (day 0) of the acquisition. The number of 
observation N in each quintile represents the largest count of non-missing data items in that quintile (this means that most of the data items in that quintile have fewer than 
N non-missing observations). Sample includes merger bids and tender offers where both acquirer and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1978-
2000.    
 
***, **, * denote difference in means between ranks 1 and 5 is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively, based on the two-sample t-test. 
 
 

































Panel A. Acquisitions sorted monthly by target B/P ratio  
Target 
B/P Rank  N  Target  
B/P          
1  518  0.148  18.3 53.9 14.7 4.1 83.0 29.9 15.9 -1.6 
2  680  0.400  24.4 48.5 22.1 6.4 79.9 32.4 17.3 -2.0 
3  691  0.608  28.7 40.8 23.2 7.0 81.2 32.7 17.8 -1.2 
4  678  0.862  27.6 37.2 21.5 10.6 77.4 35.0 19.0 -1.2 
5  570  1.388  30.7 31.2 23.0 12.0 73.7 38.4 20.1 -0.3 
Difference 1-5     -1.240***  -12.4***  22.6***  -8.3***  -7.9***  9.3***  -8.5***  -4.3***  -1.4*** 
 
Panel B. Acquisitions sorted monthly by target V/P ratio 
Target 
V/P Rank  N  Target  
V/P          
1  284  0.305  20.8 59.2 16.2 4.7 85.6 33.1 17.1 -2.7 
2  436  0.506  22.2 48.4 21.1 8.5 80.3 33.1 17.8 -2.3 
3  431  0.707  27.8 43.4 26.0 10.7 78.2 33.8 18.9 -1.7 
4  436  0.965  24.3 40.8 22.9 11.0 77.5 35.3 19.9 -1.2 
5  318  1.447  27.0 41.5 23.6 10.3 79.6 35.9 19.7 -1.0 




Table 3 (contd.) 
Mean Acquisition Characteristics by Acquirer or Target Valuation Ratio Quintiles 
 
 


































Panel C. Acquisitions sorted monthly by acquirer B/P ratio  
 
Acquirer 
B/P Rank  N  Acquirer 
B/P          
1  575  0.140  19.3 54.1 15.1 6.6 81.4 36.4 19.0 -2.0 
2  734  0.348  23.8 46.2 19.5 5.9 81.1 35.5 19.7 -1.4 
3  729  0.524  25.4 44.4 19.5 7.4 78.6 35.0 17.9 -1.6 
4  736  0.725  27.6 39.9 21.1 8.8 78.3 32.8 17.0 -0.9 
5  628  1.302  33.4 28.2 22.0 8.8 78.0 31.8 16.8 -0.4 
Difference 1-5     -1.162***  -14.1***  25.9***  -6.8***  -2.2  3.4  4.6***  2.3*  -1.6*** 
 
Panel D. Acquisitions sorted monthly by acquirer V/P ratio 
 
Acquirer 
V/P Rank  N  Acquirer 
V/P          
1  428  0.321  20.1 55.8 13.6 5.5 79.9 35.9 18.2 -2.7 
2  591  0.523  28.4 43.3 20.5 6.0 81.9 34.5 20.5 -1.5 
3  584  0.718  27.6 42.6 23.5 8.5 79.6 35.1 20.2 -1.2 
4  589  0.924  26.5 42.4 18.8 5.6 85.4 33.8 18.1 -1.2 
5  483  1.318  25.7 41.0 18.2 7.8 78.9 36.0 18.6 -0.8 
Difference  1-5    -0.997***  -5.6** 14.8*** -4.7**  -2.4  1.0  -0.1  -0.4  -1.9*** 
 Table 4  
Logistic Regressions 
Sample includes merger bids and tender offers where both acquirer and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1978-2000 and the data needed to calculate both 
B/P and V/P are available. B/P is the book-price ratio. V/P is the intrinsic value-price ratio, where the intrinsic value is estimated using the residual income model (RIM) when the 
discount rate is based on firm-specific CAPM. B/P, V/P are ranked monthly among all CRSP stocks and assigned a value between 1 and 100.  Diversifying = 1 if acquirer and 
target share the same 3-digit COMPUSTAT SIC codes; 0 otherwise. Relative Size =acquirer market value / target market value. Target size = target market value of equity. Leverage 
= acquirer total debt/total assets. For each coefficient, the second row reports the p-value. All regressions include year and acquirer 2-digit SIC major industry dummies.  
 
    Dependent Variable (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
    Cash    Stock  Tender Offer    Hostile Success 
Target B/P    0.009    0.007    -0.020   -0.018 0.014    0.012    0.021    0.021 -0.017    -0.017 
    0.011  0.041    0.000  0.000 0.000  0.002    0.000  0.000 0.000   0.000 
                            
Acquirer B/P    0.025  0.021    -0.028  -0.024  0.021  0.016    0.000  0.001 0.006   0.006 
    0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000    0.975  0.934 0.124   0.178 
                            
Target V/P     0.005  0.003     -0.007  -0.005    0.007  0.005     0.008  0.006   -0.002  0.000 
      0.094 0.239     0.003 0.047    0.026 0.077     0.094  0.223   0.550  0.967 
                            
Acquirer V/P     0.017  0.009     -0.019  -0.008    0.019  0.013     0.001  -0.003   -0.001  0.001 
      0.000 0.008     0.000 0.008    0.000 0.000     0.825  0.583   0.844  0.731 
                            
Diversifying    0.361 0.386 0.372    -0.461 -0.470  -0.478  0.526 0.538 0.549    0.739 0.771 0.756  -0.262  -0.249 -0.260 
    0.030 0.020 0.026    0.002 0.001 0.001  0.003 0.003 0.003    0.005 0.003 0.004  0.140 0.159  0.144 
                            
Log of     0.417 0.339 0.443    -0.220 -0.119  -0.240  0.216 0.154 0.247    -0.523 -0.552 -0.512  0.448  0.447  0.449 
Relative Size    0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000 0.011 0.000  0.000 0.005 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
                            
Log of Target     0.062 0.000 0.083    -0.173 -0.062  -0.197  0.192 0.126 0.223    0.368 0.304 0.386  -0.148  -0.101 -0.148 
Size    0.302 0.998 0.177    0.001 0.197 0.000  0.002 0.032 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000  0.013 0.085  0.014 
                            
Leverage     -0.691 -0.407 -0.785   -0.894 -1.346 -0.880  -0.868 -0.630 -1.076   0.208 0.694 0.202  0.634 0.373  0.631 
    0.222 0.459 0.172    0.058 0.003 0.064  0.129 0.264 0.068    0.798 0.379 0.805  0.261 0.499  0.263 
                            
Intercept    -4.041 -3.023 -4.498   3.744 2.011  4.213  -4.074 -3.124 -4.717   -6.513 -5.609 -6.838  2.828  2.084  2.817 
    0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.002  0.000 
                            
Sample Size    1513 1513  1513    1513 1513 1513  1513 1513 1513    1479 1479 1479  1513 1513 1513 
Pseudo-R
2    .1790 .1634  .1850    .2232 .1860 .2302  .1915 .1851 .2044    .2238 .2084 .2256  .1359 .1227 .1359   
Table 5 
Least Squares Regressions 
Acquirer and target announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are measured over the three days (-1,1) around the announcement (day 0) of the acquisition. Bid 
premium is the ratio of the bid price offered by the acquirer to the target stock price 5 days prior to the announcement of the takeover bid.  Sample includes merger bids and tender 
offers where both acquirer and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1978-2000 and the data needed to calculate both B/P and V/P are available. B/P is the 
book-price ratio. V/P is the intrinsic value-price ratio, where the intrinsic value is estimated using the residual income model (RIM) when the discount rate is based on firm-specific 
CAPM. B/P, V/P are ranked monthly among all CRSP stocks and assigned a value between 1 and 100.  Relative Size =acquirer market value / target market value. Target size = 
target market value of equity. Leverage = acquirer total debt/total assets.  For each coefficient, the second row reports the t-statistic. All regressions include year and acquirer 2-digit 
SIC major industry dummies. 
 
    Dependent Variable 
     







Target B/P    0.222  0.207    0.136  0.114 0.007  0.001 
    6.45  5.92    5.18  4.28  0.79  0.08 
                 
Acquirer B/P    -0.066  -0.065    -0.019  -0.044 0.056   0.042 
    -1.68  -1.57    -0.64  -1.42  5.26   3.72 
                 
Target V/P     0.108  0.086     0.080  0.068   0.008  0.006 
     3.94  3.15     3.85  3.26   1.07  0.87 
                 
Acquirer V/P     -0.004  -0.028     0.048  0.037   0.044  0.031 
     -0.12  -0.84     2.05  1.47   5.23  3.36 
                 
Log of Relative Size     1.977 2.020 2.093    3.263 3.408 3.422  0.778 0.668 0.824 
    3.73 3.91 3.94    8.06 8.71 8.46  5.36 4.76 5.67 
                 
Log of Target Size    -0.584 -0.964 -0.335    0.300 0.206 0.535  0.130 0.067 0.168 
    -1.07 -1.80 -0.61    0.72 0.51 1.28  0.87 0.46 1.12 
                 
Leverage    -13.074 -10.927 -13.372    -7.836 -6.783 -8.025  1.941  2.418  1.892 
    -2.57 -2.14 -2.63    -2.03 -1.77 -2.09  1.40  1.76  1.37 
                 
Intercept    32.780 37.710 28.387    5.970 6.364 1.568  -8.955  -7.974  -9.795 
    5.56 6.63 4.68    1.33 1.48 0.34  -5.56  -5.17  -5.91 
                 
Sample Size    1479 1479 1479    1513 1513 1513  1513 1513 1513 
Adjusted-R
2    .0869 .0710 .0920    .0978 .0965 .1064  .0576 .0569 .0654 Appendix Table 
 
Summary of Predictions and Main Findings 
 
This table summarizes the predictions from the Misvaluation Hypothesis and main results of the paper. Panel A reports the acquirer minus target mean 
differences in book-to-price ratios and in residual income value-to-price ratios for given means of payment and form of transaction, and also reports cash minus 
stock mean differences in valuation ratios among acquirers, and among targets. The relation between takeover characteristics and target and acquirer 
misvaluation measures in univariate tests is reported in Panel B and in multivariate tests is reported in Panel C. The intrinsic value V is calculated from the 
Residual Income Model.  Cash = 1 if the acquisition is all cash; 0 otherwise. Stock = 1 if the acquisition is all stock; 0 otherwise. Tender Offer = 1 if the 
acquisition is a tender offer; 0 otherwise. Hostile = 1 if the acquisition is viewed as hostile by target management; 0 otherwise. Success = 1 if the offer is 
successful; 0 otherwise. Acquirer and target announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are measured over the three days (-1,1) around the 
announcement (day 0) of the acquisition. Bid premium is the ratio of the bid price offered by the acquirer to the target stock price 5 days prior to the 
announcement of the takeover bid.  Pred is for predictions and Res is for results. 
 
Panel A: Valuation Difference 
    Acquirer – Target  Cash – Stock 
    All    Cash Stock  Tender  Offer    Merger Target  Acquirer 
   Pred  Res   Pred Res  Pred Res  Pred Res    Pred Res  Pred  Res  Pred  Res 
B/P   –  –***    – –***  – –***  – –***    – –***  +  +***  +  +***
V/P   –  –***    – –**  – –***  –     – –***  +  +***  +  +***
 
 
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
   Cash    Stock  Tender Offer  Hostile  Success  Bid Premium  Target CAR Acquirer CAR
   Pred  Res    Pred  Res Pred  Res Pred Res Pred  Res Pred  Res  Pred  Res Pred  Res 
Target B/P   + +***    – –***  + +***  +  +***  – –***  + +***  + +*** +  +*** 
Acquirer B/P  + +***    – –***    +***         – –***  – –*  + +*** 
Target V/P   + +*    – –***  + +**  +  +***  – –*  +    +    +  +*** 
Acquirer V/P  + +**   – –***    +**          –    –    +  +*** 
  
Appendix Table contd. 
 
Summary of Predictions and Main Findings 
 
Panel C: Multivariate Tests 
   Cash    Stock  Tender Offer  Hostile  Success  Bid Premium  Target CAR  Acquirer CAR
   Pred  Res   Pred  Res Pred  Res Pred Res Pred  Res Pred  Res  Pred  Res  Pred  Res 
Target B/P   +  +**    –  –*** +  +*** +  +*** –  –*** +  +***  +  +***  +  
Acquirer B/P  + +***    – –***    +***          –  –(a)  –    +  +***
Target V/P   + +*(b)    – –**  +  +*  + +*(b)  –      +  +***  +  +***  +   






1.  + (–) indicates a positive (negative) relation between the B/P and V/P measures with the takeover characteristics.  
2.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, two-tailed tests respectively. 
3.  The significance levels for the univariate tests are based on overall sample, and those for the multivariate tests are for the regressions using all four 
misvaluation measures. 
4. (a)
 indicates significance at 12% level, two-tailed test. 
5.  (b) reports significance for the regression when acquirer and target V/P measures are included but acquirer and target B/P measures are excluded. For these 
cells, the variable was insignificant when all four misvaluation ratios are included in the regression. 
  
 